2 however, by procedural and institutional aspects of the system that suggest it will tend to favour claimants and, more specifically, those states and other actors that wield power over appointing authorities or the system as a whole. On the other hand, other states and investors (especially those that bring claims against a powerful state) can expect to be disadvantaged.
To the degree that such perceptions of bias have currency, as is argued here, this arises primarily from the use of arbitration to decide finally questions of public law. 2 First, the novel situation in which claims can be brought by only one class of parties, and only the other class can be found to have violated the treaty, provides investment treaty arbitrators (including those who are state-appointed) with an incentive to favour claimants in order to advance the interests of the industry and their position within it.
Secondly, the fact that arbitrators are appointed on a case-by-case basis raises the concern that they will seek to please those who hold power in the key appointing authorities and in the arbitration industry. In both respects, the absence of institutional safeguards of impartiality and independence-especially those of security of tenure, prohibitions on outside remuneration, and an objective method of case-by-case assignment-undermines the normative basis for the adjudicative system's displacement of other modes of decision-making.
Those who promote investment treaty arbitration usually do so in conjunction with a robust criticism of both domestic courts (as apparently or actually biased against foreign investors) and international diplomacy (as 'political' rather than governed by law).
3 Investment treaty arbitration is said to address the limitations of these other forms of decision-making by laying out predictable rules to govern relations between <Schill, Chapter 20> 3 investors and states and by allowing investors to bring claims against states for resolution by a fair process. An initial difficulty with this position, not addressed here but worth reflecting upon, is that investment treaties generally do not establish coherent, non-contradictory rules that are capable of being known and thus followed on a reasonably reliable basis, but rather a set of broadly-framed ideals that have in turn been assigned different and at times conflicting 4 meanings when interpreted by arbitrators.
It is an open question whether a lack of clarity or coherence in the standards that regulate states and that implicate investors can be said to undermine the objective of a rules-based system; 5 one's answer may depend for instance on whether one regards standards or rules as more effective at offering guidance in the circumstances 6 and whether one concludes that states should in the present context enjoy the benefits of clarity or predictability as elements of the rule of law. A more immediate concern, though, arises from another aspect of the association of investment treaty arbitration with the rule of law. The problem is that the system appears not to deliver on a core component of fair process, especially the demands of independence (and impartiality) 7 in the final judgment of public law. independence of the judicial power has always to be understood as an instrument to achieve the goal of impartiality; and that independence has to be conceived of as neutrality, and absence of the subordination of the judge a) from the parties to the conflict, b) from any other power interested in a given resolution of the conflict, and as far as possible c) from the bias of passions and partiality of the judge himself or herself' (emphasis in the original).
<Schill, Chapter 20> 4 Adjudication is often said to advance the rule of law. Needless to say, the rule of law is a concept that is given different meanings, sometimes divergent. However, the concept is widely regarded to include at the procedural level the requirement for a fair decision-making process in circumstances where a government decision affects significantly an individual or specific group, based on the provision of adequate notice and an opportunity to reply, and of a decision by an independent and impartial decision-maker. Just how the rule of law should apply to the benefit of states, as opposed to individuals, where they are subject to review at the international level, is a challenging question 8 and it may be that the implementation of relevant principles should vary where a decision affects people or groups not directly but rather through the vehicle of their state. 9 Yet where it is claimed that the shift to adjudication advances the rule of law, it is also pertinent to ask whether and how procedural components of that concept are reflected in the particular form of adjudication that is on offer. In this chapter, the argument is that investment treaty arbitration falls short in institutional terms due to its unique combination of arbitration and public law, its asymmetrical 10 claims structure, its reliance on executive officials to make case-bycase appointments, and its attenuation of judicial oversight. The focus as such is not <Schill, Chapter 20> 5 on actual bias in investment treaty arbitration but, more appropriately, on institutional and procedural aspects of the system that raise suspicions of bias.
II. Context

A. The Uniqueness of Investment Treaty Arbitration
To elaborate on the procedural concerns in investment treaty arbitration it is necessary to outline how the system intertwines public law and international adjudication in order to subject questions of sovereign authority and public budgeting-also referred to here as matters of public law and policy-to international review. What is unique about investment treaty arbitration is the way in which it engages issues of public law, relative to other forms of international adjudication. The system is international and subject to public international law because it is established by treaties between states.
Unlike domestic public law, therefore, it is established by agreements between public entities that do not interact with each other within a hierarchical system of sovereign authority and that are not subject to a classical separation of powers. <Schill, Chapter 20> 8
B. A Caution on Domestic Analogies
The uniqueness of investment treaty arbitration makes it useful but also questionable to examine analogies in domestic law so as to illuminate the system and its intended meaning. 17 The challenge goes beyond the usual hazards of legal transplantation, such as the difficulty of reducing different rules and processes to particular forms despite their varying contexts and histories, the risk of losing sight of the details while searching for a general unifying position, or the possibility that an outsider may discover and borrow only what he or she prefers to find in a particular jurisdiction.
These pitfalls are always important to keep in mind. 18 They highlight the importance of examining sources in public international law-above all where they engage the regulatory relationship in ways comparable to investment treaty arbitration-with at least as much priority as domestic sources. Likewise, there are limitations to the utility of domestic law and domestic legal systems as a source of guidance to interpret investment treaties. For example, if one were to look to these sources for an indication of how to interpret a particular treaty, one should presumably begin (and arguably end) with the domestic law of the relevant state parties.
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Beyond the question of appropriate sources, there is a further challenge in an attempt to use domestic analogues to inform adjudicative decision-making on the international plane (and perhaps vice versa). An adjudicator who exercises authority over the public law and policy of a state, pursuant to a broadly-framed treaty, must recognize that his or her own sovereign decision-making role is in key respects more determinative than that of a domestic judge. <Schill, Chapter 20>
substantive questions-whether governments should pursue certain outcomes;
whether individual rights or interests should take precedence over community concerns; how ideals like democracy, justice, and efficiency should be balanced;
whether the mediation of conflicting rights and interests is best resolved through adjudication-because these are among the most contested elements of the rule of the law, 36 leading to myriad thick notions of the concept. 37 There Brunnee and Toope (n 11 above) 11-12, 18.
40 Shklar (n 37 above) 16; it is notable that Shklar has been widely misquoted as having claimed in this work that the '"Rule of Law" has become meaningless thanks to ideological abuse and general over-use' (p 1); while Shklar mentioned this at the outset of this work as one position, she did not adopt it as her own and indeed described the position as 'irrelevant' from a historical perspective.
<Schill, Chapter 20> 13 academic circles than are substantive notions, and yet it is more widely discussed in public discourse. 41 Perhaps this indicates a greater level of agreement on what the rule of law should mean procedurally, even if procedural fairness is itself a flexible concept (and even if the degree of fairness that a decision-making process demands may vary according to the significance of the decision for those affected, the purpose of the regulatory scheme and the role of the decision-maker within it, the historical practices of the relevant body and jurisdiction, and so on). No doubt, the requirements of independence must also accommodate a range of institutional and regulatory settings for decision-making. 42 Even so, in the light of the common tendency to associate investment treaty arbitration with the rule of law, it is pertinent to examine the system itself in terms of the procedural elements of the concept.
It could be that expectations of procedural fairness should be tempered where it is a state rather than an individual that is said to have been disadvantaged by apparent bias in international adjudication (although, to be clear, my own argument here is that both some investors and some states are disadvantaged by unfairness in investment treaty arbitration, while others benefit). The impetus for demands of fair process emerge historically from manifold encroachments of state power on individuals, encroachments that demand that decision-makers be bound by law and, alongside this, that courts be insulated from improper influence. 43 The rule of law concept evolved as a framework for protecting individuals from the state, and foreign investors (and other foreign nationals) are of course vulnerable to state abuse. In the light of this, there are important questions about the place of the rule of law in the international sphere. Fuller's was not a dogmatic, substantive natural law position: rather, it was a position which built out from certain valued procedural tenets widely associated with the rule of law . . . It was this universal 'inner morality of law' which provided the necessary connection between law and morality, and not the 'external' or substantive morality which infused the content of law in different ways in different systems.
Fuller's template applies to law-making but is also relevant to decision-making in specific cases or disputes. Any examination of the fairness of a process of decisionmaking must account for the role and character of that process and its implications for those who are affected by it. Based on ancient sources, procedural fairness in decision-making entails two key principles. First is that of audi alterem partem, 'hear the other side', referring to the need to provide notice and an opportunity to reply.
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Second is the principle of nemo judex sua causa, 'no one shall judge his own cause', referring to the requirement for an unbiased decision-maker. 63 Thus, if the rule of law is invoked to refer to fairness in decision-making, then the independence of the decision-maker is an integral consideration, even if the ways in which independence is advanced may vary. In theory, at least, it is still unquestioned doctrine that the law ought to be general, equal, and certain, and that it ought to be administered by independent judges. This involves not only . . . some degree of separation of powers and the recognition of the principle of nulla poena sine lege, but also quite generally that government can not coerce the private citizen in the service of the momentary goals of its policy, but only where it is required by the general rules of law. Indeed . . . the independent judge is not supposed to be concerned with the particular ends the government is pursuing or even to know about them.
These references convey that a commitment to the rule of law in law-making generally, as well as in the specific instance of adjudicative decision-making, is tied to the independence of the courts. 66 On the other hand, where the rules in a supposedly rules-based system are subject to an adjudicative process that lacks independence, it is difficult to describe the system as supportive of the rule of law. Likewise, the role of <Schill, Chapter 20> independent courts is a fundamental, or at least widely assumed, component of procedural fairness.
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In domestic law, the adjudicative authority to review the state's sovereign decisions, even in its role as ultimate legislator, is assigned to courts so as to insulate that review function from other powers. 68 According to Peter Russell: 'the case for subjecting government itself . . . to legal limits on its authority' is based on the liberal rule of law premise that 'disputes about whether the non-judicial branches of government have exercised their powers in a manner authorized by law must be decided by judges those branches do not control'. 69 To further this separation, and to ensure public confidence, objective safeguards of independence were extended historically to the judicial office.
These include the safeguards of appointment of the judge for a set tenure; prohibitions on removal from office other than for cause; guarantees of the judicial salary; 70 and assurances of administrative independence, including control by a court of its docket, assignment of judges to specific cases, and so on. 71 The presence of these safeguards establishes an institutional foundation for the special capacity and legitimacy of judges both to resolve disputes between parties and to review other public decisions. Independence of the judiciary has normally been thought of as freedom from interference by the executive or legislature in the exercise of the judicial function . . . In modern times, with the steady growth of corporate giants, it is of utmost importance that the independence of the judiciary from business or corporate interests should also be secured. In short, independence of the judiciary implies not only that a judge be free from governmental and political pressure and political entanglement but also that he should be removed from financial and business entanglements likely to affect, or rather to seem to affect him in the exercise of his judicial function.
IV Concerns about Independence in Investment Treaty Arbitration
The absence of security of tenure and other safeguards in investment treaty arbitration, due to its uniqueness as a form of public law arbitration, is important because it raises a serious concern about bias in the system. In particular, it founds an apprehension of bias in favour of claimants (especially where they are likely repeat players or otherwise heavy consumers of legal and arbitration services) and, more specifically, in favour of those states that wield major power over appointing authorities or the system as a whole. In turn, respondent states in general, as well as those investors who bring claims against such powerful states, are likely to be disadvantaged unfairly. This is so for two main reasons. 
A. The Inappropriate Influence of Appointing Authorities
Because investment treaty arbitrators are appointed case-by-case, obvious questions arise about the role of appointing authorities under investment treaties. The appointing authorities exercise various discretionary powers, including the power to appoint the presiding arbitrator where the disputing parties (or party-appointed arbitrators) do not agree on who to appoint, the power to appoint a party-appointed arbitrator where the relevant party does not do so, the power to decide challenges alleging a conflict of interest on the part of an arbitrator (or to determine who should resolve such challenges), and-pursuant to the ICSID Convention-the power to appoint all three members of an annulment tribunal.
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Where an adjudicator lacks secure tenure, the appointing authority obviously has much greater influence over how the adjudicative process will unfold, case to case, than where the appointment is made once and for a lengthy period. In the latter circumstance, an appointing authority will no doubt consider how a judicial appointment is likely to alter the ideological inclinations of the bench over a judge's term of office, for example. 87 But the authority is in a position to act on these preferences only at the time of appointment; it cannot adjust its decision on an ongoing basis as it learns of specific claims, the identity of the claimant or respondent, <Schill, Chapter 20> 24 the issues raised, the implications of a potential decision, the impact on the appointing authority and its associates, and so on. With case-by-case appointments, an appointing authority is in a position to do all of these things. This is not to say that the resulting decision will necessarily have been based on improper considerations. But it may have been, and clearly the authority is in a far stronger position to manage the allocation of adjudicative power within the system-so as to accentuate disciplines on some states and alleviate them for others, for instance-than if objective safeguards of independence were present. The fact that this is possible in itself founds a credible suspicion of bias. Simply put, case-by-case appointment may be seen to operate in favour of those who wield power in the appointing authority at the expense of those who do not.
To whom are these powers allocated under investment treaties? One would expect that in an impartial and independent system these powers would be assigned to an entity that was reasonably free of apparent bias in favour of investor or state interests (or particular investor or state interests). This is arguably so under the few investment (1) with the concurrence of the state parties to the ICSID Convention. 96 The difficulty with this is that, given its nomination arrangements, its weighted voting, and its governance structure, it is difficult for an informed outsider to conclude with 
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The scare quotes are simply to convey that this is not a typical court in the manner of other domestic and international entities bearing the name. As Yves Dezaley and Brant Garth put it, the ICC Court 'is really an oversight committee that reviews arbitration appointments and decisions It is reasonable, then, to suspect that ICC officials, when appointing arbitrators to specific cases or when resolving conflict of interest claims against arbitrators, will tend to favour the interests of investors, on whose behalf the ICC works and lobbies, over the regulatory priorities of states. Where the president of an international tribunal, appointed to decide key questions of public law, is chosen by an arm of the ICC, it is indeed difficult to describe this as anything other than an utter failure to ensure judicial independence 'from business and corporate interests' and to insulate the adjudicator from 'financial and business entanglements likely to affect, or rather to seem to affect him in the exercise of his judicial function'. 105 An analogous situation in the US context might involve a takings dispute between a business entity and a state government being resolved, not by the Supreme Court, but by an arbitration tribunal, the presiding member of which was appointed by the US Chamber of Commerce. To describe this as an independent arrangement for the adjudication of public law would be untenable.
Because of the role played in the system by organizations likely to favour major states or international business-combined with the use of adjudication to make final decisions about matters of great importance to states and their people-the lack of objective safeguards in investment treaty arbitration undermines the claims that the system delivers a fair, rules-based process. According to 
B. The Inappropriate Influence of Private Parties
Security of tenure serves also to insulate adjudicators from powerful private interests.
As such, it is a means to ensure that no one can claim credibly that a judge decided a dispute or interpreted the law in order to further his or her own financial The operation of the market in the selection of arbitrators . . . provides a key to understanding the justice that emerges from the decisions of arbitrators.
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The new generation of [arbitration] technocrats . . . emphasizes their ability to satisfy the consumers in order to gain repeat business.
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For the lawyers and their justice, the question is how to affirm the autonomy necessary for legitimacy while at the same time manifesting sufficient fidelity to the economic powers who must in the end find these services worth purchasing and deploying.
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It is good arbitration politics to thank business lawyers or other acquaintances who bring nice arbitration matters by letting them have limited access to the arbitration market. This system of exchange of favors is essential to success in arbitration, a career dependent on personal relations.
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The growth of the market in arbitration is also evident in the competition that can be seen among different national approaches and centers. for example, which is really an oversight committee that reviews arbitration appointments and decisions, appears to be particularly sensitive to the business clientele . . .
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The multinational companies are in this way investing in the construction of these legal services that serve them. [judges] hold office mean that they have no personal career interest to be served by the way they go in deciding cases that come before them.' 125 In the absence of the safeguards, the career interests return with a vengeance, with major consequence in the adjudication of public law.
C. Actual versus Perceived Bias
Some have argued that concerns about apparent bias in investment treaty arbitration are misplaced because there is no proof of actual bias in the system. This response misconstrues the standards of independence that apply to judges and typically to other adjudicators. It is rarely if ever a requirement in adjudication that actual bias be proven in order to disqualify an adjudicator (although proof of actual bias will of course suffice to disqualify). Rather, the requirement is for an absence of an unacceptable 'apprehension' of bias, or 'appearance' or 'suspicion' or 'danger' of bias, 126 so as to recognize that the absence of actual bias, while vital, is not enough.
What is also required is a sound basis for an informed outsider to conclude that the adjudicator is sufficiently insulated from inappropriate bias. 
D. Empirical Study of Actual Bias
A series of related arguments have been made to the effect that the experience in investment treaty arbitration to date reveals the system to be neutral and independent.
For instance, it is sometimes said that claimants are frequently unsuccessful and that, even where the claimant is successful, the outcome is usually an award of only a claims' ability to withstand objections for lack of jurisdiction, and that investors from the richest countries had the most success in securing ICSID jurisdiction. 139 In two detailed studies, Susan Franck found that investors were successful and received damages in twenty of the fifty-two final awards reviewed 140 <Schill, Chapter 20>
E. Existing Protections within in the System
In a recent article, Charles Brower and Stephan Schill responded in detail to concerns about apparent bias in investment treaty arbitration. 145 One of their main points 146 was that the argument that there is such a concern 'disregards that arbitrators are impartial and independent dispute resolvers who interpret and apply the governing law and are subject to a number of mechanisms that can prevent private interests from 145 Brower and Schill (n 1 above). <Schill, Chapter 20> taking precedence over public interests'. 147 They emphasized that investment arbitrators are subject to 'several formal and informal mechanisms that ensure the impartiality and independence of arbitrators'. treaty 148 Among these, they refer to the duty of arbitrators to disclose information that may reveal impartiality, the ability of a disputing party to challenge an arbitrator's appointment before a domestic court, appointing authority, or arbitral institution, and the possibility for public scrutiny based on the dissemination of awards in professional communities and online.
Each of these mechanisms is important to assuage concern about bias. But all apply also in the case of independent courts that decide public law. They are, as such, complementary to and not substitutes for the other safeguards that courts enjoy. One would not say that an automobile was roadworthy because it had an engine, brakes, and chassis, but no wheels or windows. All of a series of components may be essential for the operation of the whole. And, as widely recognized, safeguards like security of tenure are critical preconditions-though not absolute guarantees-to the assurance of judicial independence. To withdraw these components, even while leaving others in place, is to dilute the standard. Brower and Schill's counterargument, in essence, does not justify the removal of objective safeguards in the case of investment treaty arbitrators. It is really a claim that arbitrators should be subject to a lower standard than the domestic and international courts which carry out similar functions.
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Of particular importance for Brower and Schill as a means to protect against impartiality are the reputations of arbitrators and the point that 'appointments . . . are essentially merit-based' in that 'the crucial factor for appointment is not the possible or real bias of an arbitrator' but rather 'his or her reputation for impartial and independent judgement'. 150 An investment treaty arbitrator's reputation, say Brower and Schill, 'is too fragile to risk by biased decisionmaking and therefore works as a 147
Brower and Schill (n 1 above) 489.
148
ibid 491.
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For further discussion in response to the point that investment treaty arbitration warrants a lower standard of impartiality and independence, see Van Harten (n 146 above) 22-6.
150
Brower and Schill (n 1 above) 492.
<Schill, Chapter 20> 40 control mechanism that ensures the arbitrators' independence and impartiality'.
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The difficulty with this point is that, for anyone who must think about how to sec appointments or advance the industry, the key reputational concern is one's status among those with power over appointments and over the wider success of the industry. In investment treaty arbitration, the actors who wield such power cannot be assumed by the outsider to prefer an impartial and independent approach to the resolution of all investor-state disputes. It is likely, rather, that they will prefer approaches that accord with their own interests. Referring to the market for 'meritbased' appointments is thus another way of describing how arbitrators will strive to appease those who have influence in the appointing authorities and over the industry.
It is precisely this concern of the untenured adjudicator for his or her reputation in the marketplace that undermines the claim to independence. 
V. Conclusion
Some proponents of investment treaty arbitration are quick to judge the substantive choices of states but reluctant to acknowledge the procedural failings of investment treaty arbitration. Above all, there is a tendency to downplay the system's inattention to well-known safeguards of judicial independence. Yet to defend investment treaty arbitration as a rule of law-based alternative to domestic courts and to international diplomacy is to convey a high expectation of fairness in the system. The process is adjudicative; it is used to decide public law; it is highly determinative; it involves the review of legislative and judicial decisions as well as broad policy decisions of the executive; it circumvents domestic remedies; it leads to state liability involving potentially vast sums; it triggers coercive enforcement in many countries; it may lead to severe losses for investors whose claims fail or who face a costs award. Thus, it is problematic to make the rule of law argument and then to argue that-despite all this-the system need not satisfy the standards of independence that ensure fairness in courts carrying out similar functions. Advocates for the system face a quandary. They must support adjudication, asserting its superiority over institutional alternatives in making regulatory choices. But they must defend a particular form of adjudication that eschews the hallmarks of judicial independence. By implication, many rule of law-based defences of the system seek to impose a set of policy prescriptions on some but not all states and to ensure rigorous protections for some but not all foreign investors. Where one or another state or investor stands in the system-in terms of the degree of discipline to which it will be subjected or the level of protection it can expect-will depend on one's estimation of the attitudes of the relevant appointing authority and of gatekeepers among the arbitrators. Ultimately, the interests of some are likely to be prioritized in ways that are unfair to others. Of course, reasonable people may differ on whether the apparent bias-arising from the allocation of appointing power within ICSID or the ICC, or from the status of claimants within the arbitration industry-seriously erodes the legitimacy of the system as a whole. But, at the very least, the inattention paid by <Schill, Chapter 20>
<Schill, Chapter 20> 42 many proponents of the system to its institutional failings undermines the normative case that they espouse.
